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CONTRACTUAL EFFORTS To ALLOCATE
THE RISK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY: Is THERE A WAY To
MAKE INDEMNITIES WORTH
MORE THAN THE PAPER THEY ARE
WRITTEN ON?
By
Penny L. Parker* and John Slavich **
A the breadth of environmental liabilities have become more appar-
ent, contracting parties have attempted to expressly apportion the
risks of these liabilities between themselves. Risk allocation issues
may arise in transactions between buyers and sellers, lenders and borrowers,
landlords and tenants, and contractors and owners. Sometimes the resulting
allocation of risk is a function of the type of transaction or the parties' rela-
tive bargaining positions. Other times parties genuinely attempt to divide
responsibility for the perceived risks in a manner considered fair for both
sides. These contractual provisions can take various forms, including not
only indemnities, but also hold harmless clauses, exculpations, disclaimers,
"as is" clauses, survival provisions and releases.'
* Penny L. Parker is a partner in the firm of Johnson, Bromberg & Leeds, Dallas,
Texas, practicing in the fields of environmental law and commercial real estate.
** John Slavich is a partner in the firm of Andrews & Kurth, Dallas, Texas, practicing in
the fields of environmental law and corporate transactional law.
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1. In practice the distinctions between these various types of contractual provisions
often become bluffed. For purposes of this article an "indemnity" is a contractual assumption
of liability on behalf of another. See infra note 6 and accompanying text. A "hold harmless"
clause and an "exculpation" are technically synonymous-that is, they "shield" or "release" a
contracting party from financial responsibility to the other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY de-
fines an exculpatory provision as one which "clears or tends to clear a person from alleged
fault or guilt; excusing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 508 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968). The terms
"hold harmless agreement" and "indemnity agreement" are sometimes used to refer to both an
indemnity and an exculpation provision. See THE HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT: A MAN-
AGEMENT GUIDE TO EVALUATION AND CONTROL 11 (4th ed. Ga. Prop. & Cas. Underwriters
1987) [hereinafter HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT] (a contract of indemnity is "often referred
to as a hold harmless agreement"). Indeed the two concepts of indemnity and exculpation are
both usually present in an indemnity agreement. For example, "Borrower agrees to indemnify
and hold Lender harmless from .. " The pertinence of the "indemnity" or the "hold harm-
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This article discusses the legal principles governing the interpretation of
indemnities and contractual risk allocation provisions,2 as well as particular
environmental concerns affecting indemnities. 3 Practical considerations in
negotiating and drafting environmental indemnities are also addressed.
4
While the primary focus of this article is on contractual environmental in-
demnities, the article also discusses other related contractual provisions and
non-contractual indemnities. 5
less" provision to any particular dispute, however, often depends upon the fortuitous circum-
stance of which party is sued or suffers a loss. In a situation where a borrower indemnifies a
lender, the indemnity provision will apply if the lender is sued or suffers a loss, because the
lender will seek recovery from the borrower. The hold harmless or exculpation will apply if
the borrower is sued or suffers the loss because the borrower will be barred from recovering
from the lender by virtue of the exculpation. Notwithstanding the usual intent of the parties to
treat these two concepts symmetrically (that is, the loss should be the responsibility of the
borrower, regardless of whether the lender is sued first or the borrower is sued first), courts
sometimes have applied different interpretive rules to indemnities and exculpations, which in
turn have led to different results. See, e.g., infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing express negligence doctrine). See also Ellis & Kessler, "Exculpation and Indemnity
Clauses," 23rd Annual Mortgage Lending Institute at 3 (Univ. of Texas School of Law, Sep-
tember 29, 1989) (". . . the rules controlling the construction and application of exculpatory
provisions have not evolved in as uniform a manner as those rules concerning the construction
and application of indemnities").
"Disclaimers" refer to contractual releases or waivers of warranties which might otherwise
be implied. "As is" clauses are generally considered warnings to buyers to determine for them-
selves whether the property to be purchased is in acceptable condition, free from defect. In the
environmental field, several courts have construed "as is" clauses narrowly to provide only a
disclaimer of warranties and not a general release of environmental liabilities. See infra notes
58-61 and accompanying text.
"Survival" provisions, though different in approach from an indemnity can be another way
in which parties allocate environmental liabilities. Contractual provisions that limit the sur-
vival of representations, warranties and indemnities to a set period of time after the transaction
closes may shift most of the risk of environmental liability to a buyer. Texas statutory restric-
tions must be observed in the drafting of this type of clause. See infra notes 44-45 and accom-
panying text. Survival clauses may not, however, cut off environmental liability if the
contractual representations and warranties are not broad enough to reasonably have been in-
tended to include statutory matters. See Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
994, 1004 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding two year limit in contract on survival of "all of the represen-
tations, warranties, promises and agreements" to cut off all contract claims, but not CERCLA
statutory claims).
"Releases," although analogous to exculpatory provisions, are used in this article to describe
general releases of claims and liabilities contemplated by settlement agreements. E.g., Mardan
Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1986) (a general release and
settlement payment of approximately $1 million paid in connection with various post-closing
disputes in an asset purchase agreement, released seller from undisclosed and unknown envi-
ronmental liabilities where the release covered "all actions, causes of action, suits ... based
upon, arising out of or in any way relating to the Purchase Agreement . .
2. See infra notes 6-45 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 67-113 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 12, 33, 44-46, 58-61 and accompanying text. Environmental indem-
nity matters not covered in this article include: requirements of the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988), which obligate the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to indemnify pesticide registrants under certain cir-
cumstances; special EPA indemnities sometimes available to hazardous waste cleanup contrac-
tors (E.g., "EPA Proposed Section 119 Guidance Document on Indemnification of Superfund
Response Action Contractors," 54 Fed. Reg. 46012 (October 31, 1989)); and indemnities by
the Texas Water Commission for engineers or contractors who perform various services at




Both common law and statutory principles must be considered to under-
stand the context in which courts construe indemnities.
A. Common Law Rules For Interpreting Indemnities
An indemnity can be described generally as a contract between two parties
whereby one agrees to cover any liability, loss or damage sustained by the
other from some contemplated act or condition, or damage resulting from a
claim or demand of a third person. 6 The indemnity may represent an actual
transfer, as between the parties, of liability that otherwise would have been
the responsibility of one of the parties at law. Alternatively, an indemnity
may represent a confirmation of a pre-existing liability that for various rea-
sons is expressed more precisely, or additionally addressed, as an indem-
nity.7 Under certain circumstances an indemnity may actually serve to
limit, not extend, the indemnitor's liability to the indemnitee. For example,
an indemnity drafted as the exclusive remedy between the parties may be
Texas Statutory Limitation on Contractor's Liability, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS ON BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 513-20 (PLI 1989)).
Sample indemnity language that addresses certain of the concerns articulated in this article
can be found in several sources, including Bell & Dayton, Environmental Due Diligence in
Real Estate Lending Transactions, 25 BULLETIN OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANK-
ING AND BUSINESS LAW 1-28 (State Bar of Texas, February 1988); Corash, Negotiating and
Drafting Provisions Allocating Environmental Liability, in ACQUIRING PROBLEM PROPERTIES-
MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 249-80 (PLI 1990); Clare, Indemnity Issues Relative to
Loan Documents and Lease Agreements; Indemnity Provisions Relating to Environmental Mat-
ters, in EMERGING ISSUES IN REAL ESTATE LAW (State Bar of Texas, Sept. 1990); Egan &
Folladori, Anatomy of an Asset Purchase Agreement, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN
TEXAS 68-74 (Professional Education Systems, Inc., 1990); Gershonowitz, What Should be in
Environmental Indemnity Clauses, 5 PRAC. REAL EST. LAWYER 55 (March 1989); J. Mosko-
witz, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 273-317 (1989 & Supp. 1990); Smith, The Treatment of Selected Environmental Issues &
Liabilities by Contract and Other Transaction Documents, with Selected Samples and Checkl-
ists, in ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN TEXAS REAL ESTATE (Professional Education Sys-
tems, Inc. 1990); Davis & Morris, Contractual Rights: Risk Limitations for Prospective Owners
and Lenders, in 2ND ANNUAL HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
11-8 (University of Texas School of Law 1990).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines an indemnity contract as one between "two par-
ties whereby the one undertakes and agrees to indemnify the other against loss or damage
arising from some contemplated act on the part of the indemnitor, or from some responsibility
assumed by the indemnitee, or from the claim or demand of a third person, that is, to make
good to him such pecuniary damage as he may suffer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 910 (Rev.
4th Ed. 1968). See also THE HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 15-16 ("A hold
harmless agreement is an agreement between two or more parties defining an obligation or
duty resting on one party, the indemnitor, to make good the liability, loss or damage that
another party, the indemnitee, has incurred or may incur."). The indemnity does not bar third
party claims against the party to be indemnified. It simply provides the indemnitee with a
vehicle for financial recovery, provided the indemnitor remains solvent, whenever a third party
succeeds in its claim against the indemnitee. The "trigger" for the indemnity obligation will
depend on the negotiation and drafting of the agreement. See e.g., infra notes 19-23 and ac-
companying text (discussing "payment" versus "liability"); 70-78 and accompanying text
(practical negotiation issues concerning the indemnity "trigger").
7. For example, to confirm that a buyer is taking the property "as is" without warranty
from the seller, the contract might also specify that the buyer indemnifies and holds the seller
harmless from any defects or liabilities that may arise after the sale.
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limited contractually to a "survival" period that is shorter than the statute of
limitations for actions that could otherwise be brought under applicable tort
and contract theories.
1. The Rule Of Strict Construction
In Texas and other jurisdictions, indemnities are usually construed strictly
against the party seeking recovery.8 This is particularly true in Texas if the
party seeking indemnification is alleged to have been negligent. 9 The rule of
strict construction does not apply if the indemnity is clear and unequivocal
on its face.' 0 In addition, recent cases in Texas and other states seem to
indicate a trend away from the rule of strict construction, especially if the
indemnity agreement is between sophisticated commercial parties."
2. Express Negligence Rule
Like many other states, Texas requires express language in order to in-
demnify a party from its own negligence.' 2 Several Texas cases hold that it
is not enough to state that the indemnity covers everything "except a party's
gross negligence and wilful misconduct", thereby implying indemnification
for simple negligence. Instead, the indemnity must say "including such
8. Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31, 34 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Contracts of
indemnity are to be strictly construed, and the courts will not read into the contract an indem-
nity term where it is clear from the language of the contract that no such term was intended");
Hudson v. Hinton, 435 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ); James Stew-
art & Co. v. Mobley, 282 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd); Rublee v.
Stevenson, 161 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942, no writ); Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Maryland v. Reed, 108 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, writ
ref'd); Smith v. Scott, 261 S.W. 1089, 1089 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924, no writ).
9. K & S Oil Well Serv., Inc. v. Cabot Corp., 491 S.W.2d 733, 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Exculpatory or indemnity clauses which attempt to
free an actor from liability for his own negligence are basically valid but must be strictly
construed").
10. Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith, 365 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Tex. 1963).
11. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Burlington Northern R.R., Inc., 751 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1985);
McClane v. Sun Oil Co., 634 F.2d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 1981); Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 736 F.
Supp. 387, 392 (D. Mass. 1990) ("[I]ndemnity clauses reflect a reasonable allocation of risks
and duties to insure achieved through negotiation between the parties"); Speers v. H.P. Hood,
Inc., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 600, 495 N.E.2d 880, 881, rev. denied, 398 Mass. 1105, 498
N.E.2d 125 (1986) ("[A]n indemnity provision is no longer to be read with any bias in favor of
the indemnitor and against the indemnitee; it is to be interpreted like any ordinary contract,
with attention to language, background, and purpose"); Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith, 365 S.W.2d at
627 (holding that where intent of parties is clearly expressed, indemnity agreements between
owners and contractors are in governed by same rules of law and construction applicable to
other business contracts and not more strictly construed); Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp. v.
Universal Health Serv., Inc., 778 S.W.2d 492, 502 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1989, writ denied)
("This court is mindful of the fact that indemnity agreements are to be strictly construed in
favor of the indemnitor. However, the doctrine strictissimijuris is not a rule of construction.
Rather it is a rule of substantive law only after the parties' intent has been ascertained through
ordinary rules of construction.") (citing Keystone Equity Management v. Thoen, 730 S.W.2d
339, 340, (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ)).
12. Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987). At least one
Texas court has held the "express negligence" rule inapplicable to exculpatory provisions.
Whitson v. Goodbodys, Inc., 773 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
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party's negligence" or words to that effect. 13
No Texas court has addressed whether a party may be expressly indemni-
fied for his or her own gross negligence or willful misconduct. Other states,
however, have held such an indemnity to be against public policy.14 It seems
likely that Texas courts would reach the same conclusion on similar public
policy grounds.
The failure of an indemnity provision to account for the express negli-
gence rule can invalidate coverage. A third party claim asserting environ-
mental liability will usually include an allegation of negligence.15 If an
indemnity fails to state that it covers a party's own negligence, any degree of
negligence may bar complete recovery under the indemnity. 16 As a result,
even if a party is adjudged to be only ten percent negligent, recovery may not
be available under an indemnity that fails expressly to include negligence. It
would appear, however, that an indemnity which envisioned recovery "ex-
cept to the extent of" a party's negligence or unless such party is "primarily
negligent" would permit recovery where such party's negligence was not the
sole or primary cause of the damages. 17
3. Statute Of Limitations
A cause of action under an indemnity is normally held to accrue at the
time an indemnifying event occurs, not before. 1 The precise date of accrual
depends upon when the indemnified party incurred the type of loss ad-
dressed in the indemnity contract. For example, an indemnity of payment
13. B-F-W Constr. Co., v. Garza, 748 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no
writ) ("[R]egardless of cause or of any fault or negligence of contractor" held sufficient); Ad-
ams v. Spring Valley Constr. Co., 728 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding that language within the "four corners" of the contract must say "caused by
indemnified party's own negligence");.
14. E.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 698 F. Supp. 951,
972 (D.D.C. 1988) (gross negligence and willful misconduct cannot be indemnified against).
See also Ellis & Kessler, supra note 1, at 11 ("Texas courts have not, however, addressed the
issue of whether a party may be indemnified for the consequences of its gross negligence").
15. For example, a third party plaintiff might assert that the property owner failed to
observe due care, failed to warn others, failed to maintain the property properly and exacer-
bated preexisting conditions.
16. Singleton v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 729 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1987) (indem-
nity provision excluding "sole negligence" not precise enough to permit recovery in situation
of concurrent negligence). But see Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Personnel, Inc., 768
S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. 1989) (degrees of negligence need not be expressed; simple reference to
negligence suffices). Commentators have criticized the Atlantic Richfield decision for making
less clear what had become a developing consistency among the cases since the issuance of
Ethel Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987). See ELLIS & KESSLER, supra
note 1, at 14-15.
17. Cf. Payne & Keller, Inc. v. P.P.G. Indus., 793 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. 1990) (indem-
nity which covered owner "irrespective of whether [the owner] was concurrently negligent"
enforceable as to everything except the owner's sole negligence).
18. Navarro Oil Co. v. Cross, 145 Tex. 562, 200 S.W.2d 616, 619 (1946); House of Falcon,
Inc. v. Gonzalez, 583 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) (the
court stated that "a promise to indemnify does not create any liability until the prom-
isee... [has] incurred a liability, loss, or expense"); Russell v. Lemons, 205 S.W.2d 629, 631
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Duffey v. Cross, 175 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Latimer v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 56 S.W.2d 933,
935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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accrues once the indemnified party actually incurs a payment expense, 19
while an indemnity of liability accrues once the liability of the indemnified
party becomes fixed.2 0
By contrast, the limitations period for other contract-based actions (such
as breach of contract, misrepresentation, breach of warranty, deceptive trade
practice or fraud), generally begin on the effective date of the contract, or, at
the latest, on the date when facts underlying the cause of action are first
discoverable. 2 1 If the indemnity is "derivative" in nature, with the indem-
19. Mullins v. Elieson, 611 S.W.2d 921, 925 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) ("obli-
gation matures when the loss is suffered"); Latimer v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 56 S.W.2d 933,
935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933, writ ref'd) ("the rule seems to be well settled that one
complaining of the breach of an indemnity contract must, in order to show himself entitled to
recover, show that he has paid the debt in controversy").
20. An indemnity against liability matures "as soon as liability is incurred." Mullins v.
Elieson, 611 S.W.2d 921, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); see also Bernard v.
L.S.S. Corp., 532 S.W.2d 419, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (cause of
action occurs when liability becomes fixed, "as upon rendition of a judgment"). Generally,
however, a court need not have entered a judgment against the indemnitee for him to obtain
indemnification. In K & S Oil Well Serv., Inc. v. Cabot Corp., 491 S.W.2d at 739, the manu-
facturer of an allegedly defective workover rig claimed contractual indemnity from the buyer
against an injured worker's products liability claim. Rejecting the buyer's argument that the
manufacturer had not suffered any loss, the court held that "[t]hird party actions based on
contractual indemnity against liability may be brought prior to the time judgment is rendered
against the indemnitee." Id. at 739 (citing several decisions). See also Gulf Oil v. Ford, Bacon
& Davis, Texas, 782 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ). Similarly, where
an indemnitee has settled a claim prior to adjudication, he must prove only potential rather
than actual liability to the plaintiff with whom he has settled prior to obtaining recovery from
the indemnitor. E.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d
818, 824 (Tex. 1972) (sufficient for indemnitee to show settlement was "reasonable, prudent
and in good faith"). See also Bridge Prod., Inc. v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2202 (E.D. Ill. 1990) (earliest possible date of accrual for indemnity against loss is date
plaintiff entered into its consent decrees with the State of Virginia). Indemnities are often
drafted to cover both liability and payment matters (for example, "all costs, liabilities, ex-
penses, losses, etc."), rendering unclear when the statute of limitations period begins.
21. A cause of action arising out of a contractual relation normally accrues as soon as the
contract or agreement is breached. Wichita Nat'l. Bank v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 147
S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941, no writ). With many types of contracts,
however, courts also will permit the cause of action to accrue once the breach is discovered or
reasonably should have been discovered. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc v. Castillo, 616 S.W.2d
630, 634 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 198 1, no writ) (limitations period under Deceptive Trade
Practices Act for representations made in a mechanic's lien contract commences when dam-
ages actually begin to show on the completed house); Maddox v. Oldham Little Church Foun-
dation, 411 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (limitations period
commences on breach of contract or when claimant has notice of sufficient facts to place him
on notice of breach thereof).
A fraud action based upon contract will also accrue as of the date of the contract, unless the
fraud was not discoverable until a later date. Hoerster v. Wilke, 140 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1940), aff'd, 158 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1942) (limitations period began on date
fraud was committed or if not disclosed by transactions themselves, on date fraud should have
been discovered by exercise of reasonable diligence). A breach of warranty claim in Texas may
accrue either on the date of discovery or on the date the warrantor refuses to repair the defect,
depending on the language of the warranty. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Roller, 299 S.W.
917, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 14 S.W.2d
834 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgment adopted) (limitations do not begin to run against
action for breach of warranty until defect is known or should have been ascertained) with
Austin Co. v. Vaughn Bldg. Corp., 643 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. 1982) (limitations period on
breach of express warranty that obligated construction contractor to make necessary repairs
commenced not when contractor placed defective roof on building, but when it refused to
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nity obligation arising out of breaches of representations and warranties that
appear elsewhere in a contract, it is not clear whether the limitations period
would relate to the underlying representation and warranty or to the actual
breach of indemnity. If the latter circumstance controlled, it would seem to
require that the indemnity survive even though the representations and war-
ranties on which the indemnity was based had earlier expired by their own
terms. In Bridge Products, Inc. v. Quantum Chemical Corporation22 the
court held that a contract's representations and warranties expired and that
all other contract based actions for recovery of environmental liability costs
were time-barred. The court allowed the indemnity claim, however, noting
that "breach of the promise of indemnification only occurs when the injury,
i.e., liability or money owed to a third party, is incurred. '23
An indemnity may also be considered a "continuing" indemnity.24 In
such a case no specific statute of limitations affects the indemnity as a whole,
but a statute of limitations may arise with regard to each indemnifying event.
4. Question Of Law vs. Question Of Fact
The actual interpretation of the scope and meaning of the indemnity
agreement is a question of law rather than a question of fact. 25 In the con-
repair defects once it had been notified of their existence). Actions normally accrue under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 17.41-17.854. (Vernon
1987 & Supp. 1991), on the date of the transaction. See Wyatt v. General Motors Corp., 703
S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ dism'd) (cause of action against auto-
mobile seller for breach of implied warranty accrued when vehicle was purchased, not when
injuries occurred); Feldman v. Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp., 704 S.W.2d 422, 424
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute of limitations period began
on the date the grantor entered into the allegedly fraudulent mortgage modification). Section
17.565 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, however, expressly permits an action to be
brought within two years of the date of the transaction or misrepresentation or "within two
years after the consumer discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the occurrence of the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice." Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (Vernon 1987).
22. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2202 (E.D. Ill. 1990).
23. Id. Contrast Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 1988 WL 125855 (D.N.J. 1988),
rev'g in part, 696 F. Supp. 994, 1003-4 (D.N.J. 1988) (contractual obligation to indemnify is
cut off by two year contractual limitation on "all of the representations, warranties, promises
and agreements" unless indemnitee files notice of claim with indemnitor within such two year
period).
24. Emhart Indus. v. Duracell Int'l, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549, 572 (N.D. Tenn. 1987) (in-
demnity obligation is continuous in nature and is not cut off by three year limitations period in
the contract). Generally, an indemnity remains in force during the time provided for in the
contract. See generally 42 C.J.S. INDEMNITY 11 (and cases cited therein). See also Eller v.
Erwin, 265 S.W. 595, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (contract to in-
demnify indorser of note was "continuing obligation" under which it was intended that cause
of action subject to statute of limitations would not accrue until indorser's ultimate loss had
been determined and indemnity contract ceased to be of service). In at least one decision,
however, a Texas court has ruled that where a contract specifies no time limit for performance
"the rule is that ... the law implies that it will be performed in a reasonable time." Kramer v.
Linz, 73 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1934, no writ). Moreover, courts have
applied the equitable doctrine of laches to bar an action on an indemnity even when it is
brought within the relevant limitations period. See Warren Petroleum Co. v. International
Serv. Ins. Co., 727 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. See, e.g., Kemp v Gulf Oil Corp., 745 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Interpretation
of the terms of a contract, including an indemnity clause, is a matter of law, reviewable de novo
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text of an indemnity claim, however, many factual issues arise that must be
referred to the finder of fact, whether jury or court. Such factual issues in-
clude the reasonableness of costs, the appropriateness of the behavior of the
party to be indemnified and the sufficiency of any notices that were given.
26
5. Forfeiture And The Duty To Mitigate
At common law certain actions taken by an indemnified party will cause
forfeiture or discharge of the indemnity. In general, any act that materially
increases risk under the indemnity or prejudices the rights of the indemnitor
discharges the indemnity obligation. 27 The obligation to avoid such actions
is variously described as a duty to mitigate, 28 a duty to act reasonably in
order to minimize liability under the indemnity,29 or simply a duty of good
faith and fair dealing.3 0 Some cases also address specially drafted provisions
that require by their terms that the indemnified party satisfy certain condi-
tions before being entitled to recovery.31
Texas courts have yet to address the mitigation issue, but equitable consid-
erations would likely lead a court to impose some form of duty to mitigate or
reasonableness standard on a party seeking relief under an indemnity. 32 A
on appeal"); Gulf, Colo. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 F.2d 465, 467
(5th Cir. 1966) (meaning of indemnity agreement presented question of law); Phillips Pipeline
Co. v. Richardson, 680 S.W.2d 43, 48-49 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (discussing
"clear and unequivocal" rule); UMC, Inc. v. Coonrod Elec. Co., 667 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding if no ambiguity exists, construction of
written instrument is question of law); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (when
written instrument is not ambiguous, court will construe it as a matter of law).
26. Roy L. Jones, Inc. v. Home Transp. Co., 422 F.2d 179, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1970) (ambi-
guity arising in an indemnity agreement from the term "automotive equipment" was a ques-
tion of fact not a question of law); Phillips Pipeline Co. v. Richardson, 680 S.W.2d 43, 48-49
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (discussing "clear and unequivocal" rule); UMC, Inc. v.
Coonrod Elec. Co., 667 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("the interpretation of a contract becomes a fact issue only when the application of pertinent
rules of construction leaves a genuine uncertainty as to which of two meanings is proper");
Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 565 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1978) (notice of
existence of indemnity is a question of fact and cannot be considered a question of law unless
reasonable minds could not differ).
27. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 63, 68
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
28. Emhart Indus., 665 F. Supp. at 571.
29. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 390 F. Supp. at 69 (shipping company lost any
right it might have had under indemnity because it failed in various respects to take reasonable
actions in Italian courts that might have avoided the imposition of customs duties); Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Thirteen-Fifty Inv. Co., 714 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Mo. App. 1986) (breach by indem-
nitee of duty to act reasonably to minimize liability rose to level requiring indemnitor to be
discharged under the indemnity contract).
30. Emhart Indus., 665 F. Supp. at 565 n.33 ("Although the contract terms may foreor-
dain an unreasonable result, there nonetheless remains on each party a duty to act with good
faith and fair dealing within the context of their differing diseconomic incentives").
31. E.g., Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(plaintiff barred from recovering on its breach of contract claim since it failed to give notice of
the breach, and failed to act reasonably upon discovering the contamination; plaintiff's failure
to comply with the conditions of the indemnity contract substantially prejudiced the
indemnitor).
32. No duty to mitigate exists under current Texas property law. F.D.I.C. v. Coleman,
795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990); Cocke v. Meridian Say. Ass'n, 778 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. App.-
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party entitled to an indemnity might otherwise have no incentive to mini-
mize the losses that the indemnifying party has agreed to assume.
6. Clean Hands
The equitable doctrine requiring parties to have "clean hands" before
seeking recovery under tort theories of indemnity33 has not yet been applied
to a contractual indemnity case. 34 The analogous mitigation standards dis-
cussed above, however, support the application of the doctrine in this area.
B. Statutory Limitations
Certain Texas statutory provisions may also affect the interpretation and
enforceability of contractual indemnities relating to environmental matters.
1. The Texas Anti-Indemnity Statute
The Texas Anti-Indemnity Act 35 prohibits, with certain exceptions, in-
demnification for one's own negligence if the contract pertains to certain
aspects of the oil, gas and mineral industries. In situations where the court
applies this statute, an attempt to comply with the express negligence rule
Corpus Christi, 1989, no writ). Thus it is difficult to predict whether Texas courts will adopt
special policies of "good faith", "mitigation" or comparable standards in the interpretation of
environmental indemnities where such doctrines would not apply to the remainder of the con-
tractual agreement in which the indemnity appears. Additionally, Texas does not follow the
general doctrine of "good faith and fair dealing". English v. Fisher, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.
1983). Texas does recognize the doctrine if a special relationship between the parties Arnold v.
National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987). Texas also recognizes
the doctrine if a contract expressly reserves to one party a right of approval in such party's
"sole and absolute discretion or satisfaction." Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co.,
538 S.W.2d 80, 88-89 (Tex. 1976). By contrast, contracts for the sale of goods are governed by
a duty of good faith under the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code. See TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
33. Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Arseneaux, 116 Tex. 603, 614-15, 297 S.W. 225, 231 (1927)
(he who comes into equity must come with clean hands). Texas courts have not expressly
applied the clean hands doctrine to indemnity actions between joint tortfeasors, but the ration-
ale applied to such cases is very similar. See Frantom v. Neal, 426 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (one compelled to pay damages on account of the
negligent or tortious act of another has a right of action against the latter for full indemnity
unless barred by the nature of his own conduct).
34. U.S. v. Union Gas Co., 1990 WL 113212 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (doctrine of unclean hands
cannot be used to defeat environmental liability); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys.,
715 F. Supp. 949, 955-56 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (unclean hands defense rejected); Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1451 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (unclean hands defense rejected);
Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (an owner or operator need not have "clean hands" to be entitled to seek recovery
against a prior owner of the property); but see Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F.
Supp. 1049, 1057-58 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986)
(doctrine of unclean hands bars claim for contribution under an environmental statute). In
affirming the Mardan holding on alternate grounds, the Ninth Circuit noted that most courts
had not barred contribution on the basis of unclean hands. 804 F.2d at 1457 n.3. See also
Smith Land Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1029 (1989) (under CERCLA the doctrine of caveat emptor, like the doctrine of clean
hands, is not a defense to liability for CERCLA contribution, but may only be considered in
mitigation of the amount due).




can instead lead to a voiding of the entire indemnity. Under the statutory
language, apparently actual negligence need not be present in order to render
the entire indemnity invalid. Rather, the indemnity would be considered
unenforceable even as to non-negligent matters if it purported to indemnify a
party for that party's own negligence. 36
The statute is designed principally to address certain perceived con-
tracting abuses in the oil and gas industry,37 but the breadth of the statute
can create a trap for the unwary drafter. Because various oil, gas and min-
eral drilling operations can present environmental concerns, environmental
indemnity provisions may fall within the scope of this statute. Exceptions
exist under the Act for indemnities addressing pollution damage or under-
ground damage, both of which permit an indemnity for a party's own negli-
gence. 38 Nonexempt activities include any "purchase, gathering, storage, or
transportation of oil, gas, brine water, fresh water, produced water, petro-
leum products, or other liquid commodities. ' 39
2. Indemnities Of Architects And Engineers
Texas also has a statute prohibiting architects and engineers from con-
tracting for indemnities against their own negligence. 4° Because of the in-
creasing use of these professionals in environmental remediation projects
such as asbestos abatement and underground storage tank removal, the
chances of drafting a statutorily defective indemnity also arise in this area.
The statute covers any architect or engineer who prepares, approves or
uses defective plans, designs or specifications, in any construction, alteration,
repair or maintenance project for a "building, structure, appurtenance, road,
highway, bridge, dam, levee, or other improvement to or on real property,
including moving, demolition and excavation connected with the real prop-
erty."'41 Any indemnity falling within this subject that purports to indem-
nify the architect or engineer for his or her own negligence is invalid.
The statute does not prevent an owner from seeking an indemnity from
36. The Texas statute expressly states that "a covenant, promise, agreement, or under-
standing contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement pertaining to a well for oil, gas,
or water or to a mine for a mineral... [that] ... purports to indemnify a person against certain
loss or liability for damage that is caused by ... sole or concurrent negligence ... is void and
unenforceable." Id. § 127.003(a)(1).
37. See J. Tade, DRAFTING INDEMNITY PROVISIONS IN OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS:
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANA CASE LAW TO OFFSHORE CON-
TRACTS 4, MONOGRAPH No. 12, NATURAL RESOURCES ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW SECTION (American Bar Association 1989); Tade, The Texas and Louisiana Anti-Indem-
nity Statutes as Applied to Oil and Gas Industry Offshore Contracts, 24 Hous. L. REV. 665
(1987).
38. The Texas statute excludes indemnity agreements for personal injury, death or prop-
erty injury resulting from radioactivity, property injury resulting from pollution, and property
injury resulting from reservoir or underground damage. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 127.004(l)-(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
39. Id. § 127.005(a). Most of the latter subjects were added by a 1989 amendment to the
statute. Acts 1989, ch. 1102, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4557.
40. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 130.001 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
41. Id. §§ 130.001, 130.002(l)(A).
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the architect or engineer for the owner's own negligence. 42 In addition, the
statute apparently does not prevent an architect or engineer from seeking an
indemnity on a comparative negligence basis, that is, an indemnity of the
architect or engineer to the extent of his or her non-negligence. 43
3. Shortening Of The Contractual Limitations Period
Another Texas statute prohibits parties from agreeing to limit, to a period
shorter than two years, the time in which they may bring suit on a con-
tract. 44 As a consequence, a contract that purports to limit the assertion of a
cause of action, or the survivability of representations, warranties, or indem-
nities, to a stipulated period of time must be drafted with such limitation in
mind in order to protect the enforceability of the provision. By contrast, a
contract provision stipulating that no representations, warranties or indem-
nities survive the date of the closing should be enforceable. In that situation
a representation would be deemed merged into the conveyance documents,
and no premature shortening of any applicable limitations period would
have occurred.45
C. Particular Environmental Concerns Affecting Indemnities
There are also several important developments in the environmental field
that affect the enforceability and interpretation of indemnity agreements and
related contractual allocation efforts.
1. Indemnities Under CERCLA
Although courts have generally upheld contractual indemnification agree-
ments,46 several decisions have held certain agreements not to cover statu-
42. The statute provides that "this chapter does not apply.., to an owner of an interest in
real property or persons employed solely by that owner." Id. § 130.004(a).
43. Cf. HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 64 ("This statute allows only
comparative fault indemnification of an architect, engineer, or surveyor where the liability
arises out of the design or professional duties of the architect"). The Act permits comparative
fault allocations by stating that it does not apply to negligent acts "other than those described
by this chapter." Id. § 130.005(1).
44. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.070 (Vernon 1986) ("A person may not
enter a stipulation, contract or agreement that purports to limit the time in which to bring suit
on the stipulation, contract, or agreement to a period shorter than two years. A stipulation,
contract or agreement that establishes a limitations period that is shorter than two years is
void in this state").
45. See Carter v. Barclay, 476 S.W.2d 909, 914-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no
writ) (in absence of fraud, accident or mistake, conveyance absolute on its face must be consid-
ered final expression and sole repository of the parties' agreed upon terms); Wells v. Bur-
roughs, 65 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1933, no writ) (contract of sale is
regarded as merged into deed where deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the
contract).
46. See, e.g., Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1987) (com-
plaint stated cause of action under indemnity provision of sales contract); American National
Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., 1990 WL 125368 (N.D. I1. 1990) (sophisticated business
entities may allocate risk, including the risk. of unforeseen liability under environmental stat-
utes not yet enacted at the time of contracting); Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 736 F. Supp. 387,
393 (D. Mass. 1990) (indemnity clauses are permitted under CERCLA); Southland Corp. v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. at 1000 (parties are free to enter into contractual agreements
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tory liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response and
Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA),4 7 unless the agreement "clearly
and unequivocally" expresses an intent to address such liability.48
where they are indemnified or held harmless by another party); see also Jones-Hamilton Co. v.
Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal 1990) (there is no public policy against private
parties bargaining over indemnity; the freedom of private parties to contract amongst them-
selves is not impinged by CERCLA). Several courts, however, have rejected attempts to assert
claims of noncontractual indemnities. United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92-
93 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that in effect, noncontractual indemnity claim is only a more ex-
treme form of a claim for contribution; where contribution would be barred, so would a non-
contractual indemnity claim); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Industrial Oil Tank & Line
Cleaning Serv., 730 F. Supp. 1498, 1507 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (rejecting arguments that CERCLA
creates a noncontractual right to indemnity, and that Missouri law provides for noncontrac-
tual indemnity in equity, with respect to contribution obligations under CERCLA).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) (CERCLA), as amended by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (SARA). Certain
"responsible parties" designated under CERCLA § 107(a), such as owners and operators of a
facility and generators and transporters of hazardous waste, may have liability under CER-
CLA not only in actions brought by the federal government, but also in private actions. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a). Pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a), a private party may recover response costs
from one of the responsible parties identified in CERCLA § 107(a) where there has been a
"release" or "threatened release" of a "hazardous substance" from a "facility", the release or
threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur costs in responding to the release, and the
plaintiff's response costs are "necessary" and "consistent with the national contingency plan."
See 42 U.S.C § 9607(a); see also Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957,
959 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Additionally CERCLA § 113(f) provides an express right to seek con-
tribution from "any other person who is liable or potentially liable under [CERCLA]
§ 107(a)." See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). See also Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. at 999. While courts have recognized that contribution under CERCLA § 113 shares
certain similarities with indemnification (see United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d
79, 92 (1st Cir. 1990)), that statutory provision does not contemplate the recovery of various
costs or losses that may be recoverable under a contractual indemnity (see note 73 infra) such
as costs for remediation of oil contamination, consequential damages and attorney's fees. See
Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57, 62-63 (D.N.H. 1990).
48. Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. at 1002 (contract provisions did
not specify in clear enough terms that the parties intended to include CERCLA statutory
recovery actions in the two year cut-off of liability under the "survival" clause); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. at 1295 ("If
owner/operators and generators wish to redistribute the risks distributed by Congress [under
CERCLA], they must do so clearly and unequivocally."); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co.,
668 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987), appeal dism'd, 871 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir 1988) (CER-
CLA § 107(e)(1) permits private indemnity actions, but no indemnity obligation will be im-
plied by virtue of a parent/subsidiary relationship unless expressly included in the agreement).
But cf. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d at 1462 (contractual release need not
expressly mention CERCLA liabilities to cover the same if the general release language was
broad enough "to clearly indicate that the parties intended to settle more than certain [ex-
pressly mentioned] issues"); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D.
Ind. 1990) (release of "all claims and obligations" bars all claims whether sounding in tort or
contract, as well as CERCLA and other statutory claims).
If a release is not clear and unequivocal and is thus not effective, a seller, for example,
seeking to enforce the release could be subject to claims brought by the buyer in a private
action under CERCLA, including an action to recover response costs and a contribution ac-
tion. See supra note 47. Even if a release is effective, unless the buyer's release of the seller is
accompanied by an exculpation or similar indemnification provision (see supra note 1), the
buyer will not be responsible for any losses incurred by the seller from similar CERCLA
claims brought by third parties other than the buyer.
Where the buyer and seller have not attempted contractually to allocate potential environ-
mental liabilities between themselves, courts have split on whether the doctrine of caveat
emptor may provide a defense for the seller under a common law tort action brought by the
buyer (compare Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
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Indemnification agreements are contemplated in CERCLA section
107(e)(1) which provides as follows:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or convey-
ance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any
vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or
threat of release under this Section, to any other person the liability
imposed under this Section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any
agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agree-
ment for any liability under this Section.
Courts have recognized the apparent inconsistency between the two
sentences of section 107(e)(1) and have attempted to interpret the provision
in a manner that would render each sentence consistent with the other.
Some courts have reconciled these two sentences to provide that parties can
indemnify or release each other with respect to CERCLA liability, but that
any such agreement will not bind the federal government or other third par-
ties, both of whom remain free to pursue their CERCLA claims against the
indemnified party.4 9
One court, however, has recently interpreted section 107(e)(1) of CER-
CLA to prohibit any contractual transfer of CERCLA liability between two
potentially responsible parties. In AM International, Inc. v. International
Forging Equipment 50 the court reviewed the legislative history of CER-
CLA 51 and concluded that Congress did not intend to permit "joint
denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) (caveat emptor applies) with T&E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light
Corp., 227 N.J. Super. 228, 546 A.2d 570 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (caveat emptor does
not apply)). The caveat emptor defense has been held not to be applicable in a CERCLA § 113
contribution action (Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1029 (1989)) or a CERCLA § 107 cost recovery action (Sunnen
Prod. Co. v. Chemtech Indus., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1987)).
49. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F. Supp. at 1456 (general release in settle-
ment agreement held to cover CERCLA liability where release covered "all actions, causes of
action, suits, . . . based upon, arising out of or in any way relating to the Purchase Agree-
ment..."); Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra note 46, at 393 (CERCLA prohibits a party from
shielding itself from the government through an indemnity, but "indemnification clauses are
still permitted to allocate the burdens of risks and costs among otherwise liable parties"); see
also Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Industrial Oil Tank & Mine Cleaning Serv., 730 F. Supp. at
1507; Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. at 1000; Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, v. Armstrong World Industries, 669 F. Supp. at 1293 ("CERCLA'S liability provisions
do not abrogate the parties' contractual rights"); FMC Corp. v. Northern Paper Co., 668 F.
Supp. at 1289.
50. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
51. The court specifically noted the Senate debate over the final CERCLA bill where
Senator Cannon said:
the net effect [of § 107(e)(1)] is to make the parties to such an agreement, which
would not have been liable under this section, also liable to the degree specified
in the agreement. It is my understanding that this Section is designed to elimi-
nate situations where the owner or operator of a facility uses its economic power
to force the transfer of its liability to other persons, as a cost of doing business,
thus escaping its liability under the act all together.
S. REP. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. 30, 984 (1980). Senator Randolph, one of
the bill's co-sponsors, then responded to Senator Cannon's characterization, indicating that
his interpretation of § 107(e)(1) was correct. Id. The court concluded from these remarks
that:
... Congress intended subsection 107(e)(1) to prevent the parties from contrac-
tually relieving themselves of liability under the act, whether that liability is
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tortfeasors" to seek indemnity against one another under CERCLA,
although they could seek pro-rata contribution from one another.5 2 In so
deciding, the court concluded that the second sentence of section 107(e)(1)
would be rendered "nugatory" if interpreted in the manner suggested by
other courts. 53 The court reasoned instead that Congress intended to permit
private persons to contract with others to relieve themselves of liability
under CERCLA only if such other persons were not otherwise liable under
the Act. 54
The AM International court's decision is particularly significant in its
marshaling of CERCLA's legislative history in support of its conclusion.
55
If the rule in AM International is generally followed by other courts,56 in-
demnification for CERCLA liabilities between potentially responsible parties
will not be permitted. Indemnity agreements should nonetheless remain use-
ful to allocate the risk of liabilities arising under environmental laws other
than CERCLA. 57
enforced by action of the government or in a suit by a person who performed the
clean-up and sues others for contribution under the act. In addition, by the
second sentence, Congress intended to permit any person to contract with others
not already liable under the act to provide additional liability by way of insur-
ance or indemnity.
743 F. Supp. at 529.
52. The court held that § 107(e)(1) permits indemnities between parties otherwise not
liable under CERCLA; indemnities among liable parties are not permitted according to the
court. 743 F. Supp. at 531. In a typical acquisition transaction, the seller, as the former owner
or operator of a facility, and the buyer, as the current owner or operator, will each be a "re-
sponsible party" for liability purposes under CERCLA § 107(a). Therefore, under the princi-
ple enunciated by the AM International court, neither party will be able to obtain an indemnity
from the other.
53. This is not an entirely fair criticism of the other courts' holdings. Other courts faced
with resolving the apparent conflict between the first and second sentences of § 107(e)(1) have
arrived at an interpretation which gives each sentence independent meaning and does not ap-
pear to render the second sentence "nugatory." See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. 743 F. Supp. at 529.
55. By contrast, the other courts that have interpreted § 107(e)(1) have not cited support
for their position from the legislative history of the Act. See Mardan, 804 F. Supp. at 1458
(citing to the government's position regarding the interpretation of § 107(e)(l), but not legisla-
tive history); Hays, 736 F. Supp. at 393 (construing language in the Massachusetts version of
CERCLA, but without reference to either the federal or state legislative history of the relevant
CERCLA provision); Southland Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 1000 (citing Mardan, FMC, and Chem-
ical Waste decisions, but not legislative history, for proposition that § 107(e)(1) "does not ab-
rogate the parties' contractual rights"); FMC Corp., 668 F. Supp. at 1289 (citing no legislative
history). At least one court construing CERCLA § 107(e)(1), however, has said that the gen-
eral legislative history of CERCLA is far from clear and that "CERCLA's legislative history is
sparse and generally uninformative. CERCLA was enacted hastily and is the product of polit-
ical compromise. Moreover, last minute additions and deletions to the statute render its legis-
lative history are of little practical use." Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 669 F. Supp. at
1290 n.6.
56. See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(Although AM International's citation to the legislative history has persuasive appeal, AM
International stands alone and is not the law of Ninth Circuit).
57. See AM International, 743 F. Supp. at 530 (state claims for indemnity held valid,
notwithstanding the invalidity of federal CERCLA releases). Cf Marmon Group, Inc v.
Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31, 33 (7th Cir. 1987) ("cutting oil" not a substance regulated by




2. "As Is" Clauses
Courts have held, for a variety of reasons, that "as is" clauses do not
release a seller from liability to the buyer for environmental conditions af-
fecting property. Some courts have held that an "as is" clause is not effec-
tive in releasing the seller from liability for hazardous conditions unless the
"as is" clause expressly mentions the relevant environmental condition.58
Other courts have held that an "as is" clause is a disclaimer of warranties
and may only serve to bar actions based upon a breach of warranty. 59 In the
latter cases other causes of action (such as actions under CERCLA, as well
as tort, contract misrepresentation and deceptive trade practice actions) may
still be pursued, notwithstanding the "as is" clause.
In Brockton Wholesale Beverage Co. v. Chevron U.S.A. 60 a buyer agreed to
acquire certain assets on an "as is" basis. The acquisition agreement ex-
pressly referenced the possibility of leaking underground storage tanks, but
did not disclose that several drums and a waste oil catch basin were also
buried under the property, all of which were leaking contaminants into the
soil and water. The court held that the buyer was responsible for contami-
nation attributable to underground storage tanks (including contamination
from several tanks whose existence was unknown at the time of the sale).
The court denied summary judgment as to the leaking drums and catch ba-
sin, however, since the seller's "as is" clause had not disclosed that leaking
drums and a catch basin might be present on the property.6'
3. Will State Or Federal Law Govern The Interpretation Of
Environmental Indemnities?
Normally state law governs the interpretation of contract terms, 62 but fed-
eral law governs issues affecting federal causes of action. 63 Even when fed-
eral law governs, however, state law may be incorporated to provide the
58. Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 802 (D.N.J.
1989) ("as is" clause does not excuse liability for an abnormally dangerous product such as
asbestos); Garb-Ko, Inc. v. Lansing-Lewis Servs., Inc., 167 Mich. App. 779, 423 N.W.2d 355,
358 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) ("as is" clause does not shift risk of loss to a buyer for an unknown,
undisclosed leaking storage tank; buyer is instead entitled to rescission).
59. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd
on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) ("as is" clause is a warranty disclaimer, effec-
tive only to preclude breach of warranty claims); Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus.,
735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ("as is" clause is merely a disclaimer of warranties); Inter-
national Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("as is"
clause is warranty disclaimer); Channel Master Satellite Systems, v. JFD Elec. Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 1229, 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1988) ("an 'as is' provision is merely a warranty disclaimer and as
such precludes only claims based on breach of warranty..."); Southland Corporation, 696 F.
Supp. at 1001 ("as is/where is" clause is warranty disclaimer; such clause does not supersede
an indemnification agreement, based upon the contractual principle that a more specific provi-
sion will control over a general provision in the event of an inconsistency).
60. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9998 (D. Mass. July 26, 1990).
61. Id.
62. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Ab-
sent CERCLA, these contracts would be interpreted under state law.").
63. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952); Mardan
Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d at 1457.
1991] 1363
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
content of the federal law.64 Some courts that have faced the question of
whether to develop a uniform federal law or to apply state law principles to
these contractual environmental agreements have resolved the matter in
favor of state law, even when CERCLA liability is at issue. 65 Others have
concluded that a uniform federal law must be developed. 66
II. NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING ENVIRONMENTAL
INDEMNITY PROVISIONS
Various issues arise in the negotiation and drafting of an environmental
indemnification provision. This section will focus primarily on a seller's in-
demnification obligations in the context of an acquisition transaction, such
as a stock or asset purchase or a merger, that includes real property. 67 The
64. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-29 (1979) (State law will be
applied unless either: (i) there is a clear congressional intent to develop a uniform federal
standard; (ii) the issue requires a uniform national law; (iii) state law would frustrate the fed-
eral law's objective; or (iv) a uniform federal law would not frustrate commercial relationships
predicated on state law).
65. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d at 1458 ("a uniform federal rule
should not be developed to govern the issue of whether and when agreements between private
"responsible parties" can settle disputes over contribution rights under section 107 [of CER-
CLA]"); International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466, 469 (E.D.N.Y.
1989); Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1409, 1417 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
66. Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1990);
see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d at 1466 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
("Given the need for uniformity, the potential harm to federal interests and the absence of any
disruption of commercial relations, I would hold that the adoption of a uniform federal rule
regarding CERCLA releases is called for"). The application of state law would appear to be
the better approach, however, since many environmental indemnities and agreements address
more than just environmental matters. If different rules govern" the interpretation of the envi-
ronmental and non-environmental matters, the parties may be faced with inconsistent rules of
construction and interpretation. For example in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804
F.2d at 1458, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "commercial enterprises selling
their assets or insuring themselves will normally look to state law to interpret their indemnifi-
cation provisions, which will generally indemnify the enterprises against a whole host of possi-
ble liabilities."
67. In a stock transaction or merger, the parties would expect the environmental liabilities
of the acquired entity to continue to exist, either as liabilities of the acquired entity in the case
of a stock transaction, or as liabilities of the surviving company in the case of a merger. The
parties would negotiate indemnities for environmental matters accordingly.
In asset transactions, the traditional common law rule has been that a corporation that
purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of the transferor
unless there is an express or implied assumption of liability, a de facto merger, a mere continu-
ation of the transferee by the transferor, or a fraudulent conveyance. See 15 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1990). A
number of judicial decisions have found successor liability for CERCLA liabilities notwith-
standing this common law rule. See Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal
Common Law: Responding to an Uncertain Legal Standard, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1237, 1238 n.9
(1990). In particular, two recent environmental cases have expanded the "mere continuation"
exception to the common law principle. These cases have deemed an asset purchaser to be
responsible, under newly developed federal common law, for its predecessor's generator liabil-
ity arising under CERCLA § 107(a)(3). In United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., Inc.,
739 F. Supp. 1030, 1039 (E.D.N.C. 1989) and United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 643
(W.D. Ky. 1990), CERCLA liability was imposed on an asset purchaser by reason of the
"substantial continuity" between a successor corporation and its predecessor. In Louisiana-
Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1990), however, the court deter-
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negotiation of those obligations will involve the parties' agreement regarding
the trigger for indemnification, the scope of the indemnification obligation,
and the mechanics of the obligation.
Indemnification obligations, while customary in such transactions, are
generally the subject of considerable negotiation between the parties.6 En-
vironmental issues have added a new complexity to this process, requiring
the parties to focus carefully on the identification of environmental risk and
to determine how and under what circumstances risks shall be allocated be-
tween them.69
A. The Trigger
The trigger for an indemnification agreement will depend in large part on
the nature of the transaction. In an acquisition agreement, the indemnity
may be an integral part of the overall remedies provisions,70 triggered by a
breach of any representation, warranty or covenant. 71 As such, the indemni-
mined that it did not have to consider whether to apply a continuity test where the business
segment creating the liabilities was discontinued prior to the asset sale and was not continued
by the asset purchaser. Id. As a result of the uncertainty created by these and other cases,
buyers will want to assure themselves that the indemnities they receive are broad enough to
include such potential liabilities.
The indemnification issues that arise in the context of the acquisition of commercial real
estate properties, or in connection with real estate financing transactions, will be substantially
similar to the issues generally arising in an asset acquisition transaction, and thus are not
separately addressed. In all such circumstances, buyers and sellers will attempt to allocate
responsibility for as many of the potential environmental liabilities as possible to the other
party in the transaction.
68. Typically, the seller will take the position that the buyer is purchasing an operating
business and that contingent liabilities and operational risks are considered in negotiating the
purchase price. The buyer, on the other hand, will take the position that it is acquiring a
business operation that can continue to be operated as it has been by the seller, with no envi-
ronmental property conditions that may adversely impact either the existing operations or the
buyer's expansion of operations. The negotiation process will require an accommodation of
the parties' positions somewhere on the spectrum between the two poles.
Additionally the seller may seek protection from environmental risk arising out of the
buyer's post-acquisition activities (including the buyer's exacerbation of conditions arising out
of pre-acquisition activities). Depending upon its bargaining position, the seller may also seek
release from all or selected environmental liabilities arising from preacquisition acts or condi-
tions. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
69. See Dore, A Practical Guide to Environmental Indemnification Agreements, 55 DEF.
COUNS. J. 297 (1988). Given courts' inclination to interpret indemnification provisions strictly
against the party seeking recovery (see supra notes 8-11, and accompanying text), the indemni-
tee should insist on a detailed indemnification provision. Although the parties to a transaction
may attempt to anticipate and address all potential environmental risks, they often criticize
environmental indemnities as providing, at best, an opportunity for future renegotiation of
liabilities that arise post-acquisition and, at worst, a contractual invitation to litigate the re-
sponsibility for those liabilities.
70. Many times an indemnitor will insist that the indemnification provision be the sole
remedy for an indemnitee. The indemnitee, in agreeing to such a provision, would waive any
rights to sue for breach of contract based upon representations and warranties that may have
survived the closing. Depending upon the wording of the waiver, the indemnitee also may
waive, to the extent permitted under law, its statutory rights to bring a CERCLA action. See
supra note 47. Presumably the indemnitee would not be waiving its ability to bring an action
for fraud that may have induced the indemnitee to agree to such a limitation on remedies.
71. Typical environmental representations and warranties will cover the following mat-
ters: (1) compliance with environmental laws; (2) no order, notice or other communication of
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fication may cover a much wider range of matters than those relating solely
to environmental matters, which themselves will ordinarily be the subject of
specific representations, warranties and covenants.
An indemnification provision may also be designed to deal specifically
with environmental matters. These provisions may be crafted narrowly to
address particular environmental matters, such as conditions identified in a
pre-acquisition environmental assessment, or broadly to provide indemnifi-
cation from all environmental matters. Lenders commonly require the
broader provision from borrowers in loan transactions. Specific environ-
mental indemnification provisions may be in addition to the other contrac-
tual remedies available to an indemnified party.72
Drafting the triggering provisions is often complicated by the process of
developing the defined terms that will underlie such provisions. These terms
will typically include definitions of the obligations covered by the indemnity
(generally referred to as "losses" or "damages") 73 and the substances that
alleged or potential violation, or failure to comply with, applicable law; (3) all necessary per-
mits and compliance with, and transferability of, such permits; (4) no liabilities or remedial
obligations with respect to assets or operations; (5) no generation, manufacture, transporta-
tion, treatment, storage, handling, disposal, production, importation, use or processing of any
hazardous materials except in compliance with applicable laws; (6) no release or threat of
release; (7) no underground storage tanks; and (8) no claims, liens, encumbrances or other
restrictions resulting from liabilities or arising under environmental laws. Cf. Channel Master
Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elec. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (indemnity
against violations of law, by its own language, did not cover violations of federal laws and did
not bar CERCLA action).
Covenants are more typical in loan agreements and leases, where there are ongoing opera-
tions and properties in which the other party has a continuing economic interest. Covenants
may also appear in acquisition agreements where part of the purchase price is payable after the
date the transaction closes or where there is a period of time between the execution of the
acquisition agreement and closing. These provisions will generally require, at a minimum, that
the party covenant: (i) to comply with applicable environmental laws (including procuring,
maintaining and complying with required permits, licenses and approvals); (ii) to notify the
other party of the covenanting party's spills, notices of violations or other matters relating to
compliance with law; and (iii) to not create, or permit others to create, a remedial obligation.
An indemnification provision will generally provide that losses must "arise out of or in
connection with" representations or warranties, or specified acts or conditions, in order to
trigger the indemnification obligation. One case has suggested (in the context of personal in-
jury indemnity agreements) that such triggering provisions will be afforded an expansive read-
ing under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence construing Texas law. See Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1215 n.7 (5th Cir. 1986) (dicta).
72. See Nunn v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 856 F.2d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1988)
(breach of environmental warranty in acquisition agreement). Environmental representations
and warranties may be subsumed in general representations and warranties relating to litiga-
tion, permits and compliance with laws. The preferable method is to address environmental
issues in a separate section that focuses on those matters, even though some of the specific
matters will duplicate the general matters covered elsewhere.
73. A typical broadly drafted definition of the covered obligations would refer to any and
all losses, liabilities, damages, demands, claims (including, without limitation, claims for inju-
ries to person, real or personal property or natural resources and claims for injunctive relief),
obligations, actions, judgments, causes of action, assessments, penalties, costs and expenses
(including, without limitation, the fees and disbursements of outside legal counsel, consul-
tants, investigators, accountants, laboratory fees and the charges of in-house legal counsel and
accountants), and all foreseeable and unforeseeable consequential damages.
Indemnities, like most contracts, are not normally held to include coverage for attorneys'
fees unless expressly stated. See Buck v. Johnson, 495 S.W.2d 291, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (unless provided for by statute or by contract between the parties,
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create contaminated conditions (generally referred to as "hazardous materi-
als," "materials of environmental concern" or similar terms). Defining the
term "hazardous materials" in a manner that will adequately cover all likely
environmental concerns presents a drafting challenge. Environmental stat-
utes do not consistently define which materials are covered by this term.
Many statutes purposely exclude particular types of hazardous materials be-
cause they are adequately dealt with in other statutes. For example, CER-
CLA does not cover petroleum products. 74 Some definitions in relevant
environmental statutes are admittedly so broad as to include items such as
"dirt" and "water" as pollutants.75 Additionally, the presence of certain
materials may not violate environmental statutes, but may present the possi-
bility of liability through third party toxic tort suits. 76 Threshold quantities
attorneys' fees incurred by a party to litigation are not recoverable against his adversary either
in an action in tort or a suit upon a contract). Limited exceptions to this rule exist. See TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986). The prudent drafter will, neverthe-
less, insist that the indemnity cover attorneys' fees. At least one commentator has also con-
cluded that an indemnity must specifically address a duty to defend in order for a defense
obligation to be included in the indemnification obligation. See Scheer, The Contractual In-
demnity Provision Effective to Protect an Indemnitee Against His Own Negligence or Other
Fault, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 845, 878 (1986) ("There is no reason to assume that a duty to
defend exists solely by virtue of the existence of an obligation to indemnify. If the duty to
defend is intended to be included as part of the indemnity agreement, therefore, it should be
specifically stated").
74. The definition of "hazardous substance" set forth in CERCLA § 101(14) provides
that:
[t]he term [hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including crude
oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated
as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this para-
graph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied
natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such
synthetic gas).
75. The definition of "waste" in § 26.001 of the TEXAS WATER CODE includes "other
waste" which in turn includes "sawdust" and "sand." TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.001(6),
(12) (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1991). The term "pollutant" in the same statute includes "dredged
soil," "rock," "sand" and "cellar dirt." Id. § 26.001(13). Until permit authority is delegated
to the Texas Water Commission under the federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES system), the term "other waste" is also defined to include "tail water or
runoff water from irrigation or rainwater runoff from cultivated or uncultivated range land,
pasture land, and farmland that may cause impairment of the quality of the water in the state."
Id. § 26.001(12). Even after NPDES authority is delegated to the state, the definition of
"other waste" would impliedly include non-agricultural forms of runoff waters. Id.
76. Asbestos is a hazardous substance within the meaning of CERCLA § 101(14). See 40
C.F.R § 302.4 (1990); 40 C.F.R § 401.15 (1990); 40 CF.R § 61.01(a) (1990). The presence of
asbestos does not, however, necessarily result in liability under CERCLA, since courts have
concluded that CERCLA does not provide for cost recovery actions for removal of asbestos
from the structure of a building. See 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank of Califor-
nia, 915 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Prod.
Co., 906 F.2d 1059, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990); First United Methodist Church v. United States
Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 868 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990); Retire-
ment Community Developers, Inc. v. Merine, 713 F. Supp. 153, 158 (D. Md. 1989). While
apparently no reported cases have imposed liability on building owners or managers for asbes-
tos-related health claims of tenants, employees or visitors, commentators have warned of the
future potential of toxic tort suits brought against building owners and managers arising out of
asbestos in buildings. See Billauer, Asbestos in your Bedroom: Protection for the Latest Wave of
Asbestos Litigation, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 12 (Feb. 1988). See also Layne v. GAF Corp., 42 Ohio
Misc. 2d 19, 26, 537 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ohio Comm. P1. 1988) (jury awarding verdict for
worker who claimed she had contracted mesothelioma during her employment in a federal
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are not generally a part of the definition sections in these statutes. 77 There-
fore, a simple definition referring, for example, to any substance regulated as
hazardous under applicable environmental laws may create an unworkable
standard since most properties have de minimis quantities (in some cases
naturally occurring) of these so-called hazardous substances. 78
B. The Scope
The scope of the indemnity will reflect the negotiated allocation of risks
office building that contained asbestos). It may even become possible for building occupants to
claim liability against property owners in circumstances where no asbestos-related disease has
been detected Cf Dartez v. Fiberboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (asbestos
manufacturer held liable for plaintiff's mental anguish proximately resulting from his fear of
developing disease from asbestos exposure).
Indoor pollution lawsuits are another area where very little governmental regulation has
appeared, making it difficult for building owners and operators to determine the level of
"cleanness" that must be maintained in order to avoid third party liability. The EPA has
identified indoor pollution as one of the most significant environmental human health risks
currently not regulated. See REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INDOOR AIR QUALITY (U.S. EPA
August 1989); COMPARING RISKS AND SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES (U.S. EPA
December 1989). "Sick Building Syndrome" and "Legionnaire's Disease" cases are two exam-
ples of the types of third party liabilities that may arise in indoor pollution lawsuits. See, e.g., 4
INDOOR POLLUTION L. REP. 7 (August 1990) (reporting $1 million jury verdict in a "sick
building" case where plaintiffs suffered from physical and mental health problems resulting
from multiple exposures to pesticides in an office building containing an improperly function-
ing ventilation system); Rogers v. Benjamin Moore & Co., No. 90-009348 (Dist. Ct. of Harris
Cty, 157th Jud. Dist. of Texas, February 26, 1990)) (complaint filed against public school
contractors for allegedly using materials that exposed children to high levels of hydrocarbons,
carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and formaldehyde) (reported both in 3 INDOOR POLLUTION
L. REP. 7 (April 1990) and Zimmerman, Pollution Liability Increasing, 12 NAT'L L.J., July 23,
1990, at 15); Legionnaire's Disease Claims Five Patients, 4 INDOOR POLLUTION L. REP. 1 (July
1990) (state hospital found to have "Legionella" bacteria in building's hot water system).
Buildings built or renovated since 1973 are now regarded as presenting a greater risk of
indoor pollution liability than buildings built before and after such dates, because accepted
ventilation standards during that period are now regarded as inadequate. See Zimmerman,
supra note 76, at 17, n. 11 (reporting that the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and
Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) has now revised its Standard 62-1989, because the
prior ventilation standard is considered inadequate).
77. For example, compare CERCLA § 103(a) (notification of National Response Center is
required by a person in charge of a vessel or a facility as soon as he has knowledge of any
release (other than a federally permitted release) of a hazardous substance equal to or in excess
of the reportable quantities established under CERCLA § 102), with CERCLA § 104(a)(l)
(removal costs may be incurred, in accordance with the National Contingency Plan, whenever
any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the
environment, or there is a release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any
pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public
health or welfare). Cf Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1989)
(liability element necessary for recovery of response costs is satisfied as a matter of law "if it is
shown that any release violates, or any threatened release is likely to violate, any applicable
state or federal standard, including the most stringent." Court rejected EPA's contention that
CERCLA liability attaches upon the release of any quantity of hazardous substance because
such an interpretation would exceed CERCLA's statutory purposes by imposing liability
where there has been no threat to the public or the environment).
78. Trace elemental metals are commonly found in soils, plants and water. See U.S. EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HAZARDOUS WASTE LAND TREATMENT (SW-874)
(April, 1983) at 272-78. See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d at 670 n.10 ("The
EPA has listed several other substances, such as zinc, sodium, and selenium, that are present
in most soil. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1988). Harmless and, indeed, essential to humans at low
levels, they are also toxic in higher concentrations.").
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between the parties to a transaction. These risks primarily relate to previ-
ously-created conditions or past actions that raise the specter of present or
future environmental liabilities. An additional risk may involve the "fitness
of purpose" of certain acquired property. This concern arises where the
landowner plans to utilize the property for certain purposes, such as residen-
tial housing, but is prevented from doing so by environmental conditions
existing on the property. 79
Allocation of environmental risks presents special problems. Foremost is
the issue of identifying those conditions that carry with them current liabil-
ity or the potential for future liability. Purchasers in acquisitions involving
real property will routinely commission an environmental risk investigation
to assist in the risk assessment process. A consultant's discovery of a prob-
lem may serve to negate the innocent landowner defense under CERCLA,8 0
but will not necessarily identify all the conditions that may potentially result
in liabilities (particularly the latent conditions). Additionally, while an ex-
perienced environmental engineer may be able to provide a range of costs
associated with potential liabilities, the process remains much more an art
than a science. Finally, given the broad guidelines established for cleanup,
and the resulting agency discretion, applicable cleanup standards are not
readily determinable.8' Therefore, it may be difficult to quantify the transac-
79. Cf Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir.
1988) (residential development on site of former wood-treatment facility). The seller may at-
tempt to guard against such indemnification liability by disclosure to the buyer (such as
through the Texas solid waste disposal site deed recordation requirement set forth in 31 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 335.5 (West 1989)) and imposition of a covenant restricting the use of the
property for certain purposes by buyer and its successors, accompanied by indemnification of
the seller.
80. Under the so-called "innocent landowner" defense, a prospective site owner may insu-
late itself from potential CERCLA liability for releases by a party with which it is in direct or
indirect contractual relationship by establishing that at the time of its acquisition it did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance was disposed of on, in, or at
the property. 42 U.S.C § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1990). In order to establish that a party had no
reason to know of the existence of any hazardous substance at the property, the party must
undertake, at the time it acquires title to the property, "all appropriate inquiry into the previ-
ous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary prac-
tice in an effort to minimize liability." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988). Under certain limited
circumstances the innocent landowner defense may be available to provide protection from
CERCLA claims; see United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D.
Idaho 1989). The defense does not, however, provide protection from liabilities or remedial
obligations arising under other environmental laws.
81. Neither CERCLA nor the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1988) (RCRA), establish specific numeric cleanup standards. Section 121 of
CERCLA, added by SARA, provides that CERCLA remedial actions at a site must be protec-
tive of human health and the environment, be cost effective, and be, to the extent practicable,
in accordance with the EPA's National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan (55 Fed. Reg. 9666 (March 8, 1990), amending 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (NCP)). Addition-
ally, any cleanup standard utilized in connection with the remedial actions selected must attain
legally applicable or relevant and appropriate federal and state standards, requirements, crite-
ria or limitations (ARARs) for the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants at the
site. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988). The NCP sets forth certain criteria, derived in part from
CERCLA § 121, to be considered in selecting a remedy at a Superfund site. 55 Fed. Reg. at
8849-50 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(A)- )). The EPA is to use these
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tional risks, even with respect to known problems.8 2
criteria in a process that allows consideration and balancing of site-specific factors to select the
most appropriate remedial action for the site.
Section 3004(u) of RCRA, 42 U.SC.A. 6924(u) (1988), added by the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (HWSA), requires corrective
action for releases of hazardous waste or constituents from solid waste management units at a
treatment, storage or disposal facility seeking a RCRA permit. The EPA's proposed rule enti-
tled Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Facilities (55 Fed. Reg. 30798 (July 27,
1990)) (Corrective Action Rule) would define requirements for conducting remedial investiga-
tions, evaluating potential remedies, and selecting and implementing remedies at RCRA facili-
ties based on site-specific analysis and considerations. EPA also intends that the proposed
Corrective Action Rule be applicable to response actions under CERCLA. 55 Fed. Reg.
30802.
These CERCLA and RCRA statutory and regulatory provisions grant to the federal gov-
ernment considerable flexibility in selecting remedies, thus preserving wide agency discretion
relating to the nature of treatment technology, timing of cleanup expenditures, the use of per-
manent rather than temporary remedial solutions and, in particular, applicable cleanup levels.
The EPA recognizes that
[o]ne of the more controversial issues related to corrective action is the
cleanup goals for contaminated media, or "how clean is clean." EPA has not
attempted in [its proposed Corrective Action Rule] or elsewhere to establish
specific cleanup levels for different hazardous constituents in each medium. In-
stead, EPA believes that different cleanup levels will be appropriate in different
situations, and that the levels are best established as part of the remedy selection
process.
55 Fed. Reg. 30,804. As a result, before the cleanup levels are negotiated as part of the remedy
selection process, quantification of site remediation costs will be speculative. Accord Corash,
supra note 5, at 257 ("Statutory requirements and regulatory standards, such as the National
Contingency Plan established by EPA under CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, should not
generally be used as a basis for a 'cleanness' determination. These documents contain broad
guidelines, leaving plenty of room for agency discretion"). See also J. Moskowitz, supra note 5
at 278 ("agencies often require remediation of soils which are contaminated at levels far lower
than would qualify the soils as a 'hazardous waste.' Many agencies have no predefined cleanup
levels at all, or only levels which attach to a few substances").
The cleanup standards for hazardous materials required by the Texas Water Commission
(TWC) under the State of Texas' enforcement and spill response programs and under RCRA
(implementation of which in Texas has been delegated to the TWC) for regulation of solid
waste management units contemplate that contaminated sites be cleaned up to "background"
levels (i.e. the concentrations of the materials found in the soil and groundwater of nearby non-
contaminated property). The TWC is currently considering the adoption of a risk assessment
methodology similar to that contemplated under CERCLA and the proposed Corrective Ac-
tion Rule. See McFaddin, Negotiating Contaminated Site Cleanups with the Texas Water
Commission: How Clean is Clean?, 2ND ANNUAL HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE MANAGE-
MENT INSTITUTE (University of Texas School of Law 1990). Although the TWC generally
does not establish numerical guidelines for cleanup standards, it has published detailed cleanup
criteria for groundwater and soil contamination resulting from releases from petroleum storage
tanks. See Texas Water Commission, TWC Petroleum Storage Tank Guidance Manual for
LPST Cleanup in Texas, 7-1 to 7-13 (1990). See also White, Shelton and Knebel, Cleaning Up
Our Mess: A Comparison of Clean Up Standards under Four Regulatory Programs, in Hazard-
ous Waste in Texas 193 (National Business Institute, 1990).
82. In response to numerous requests received by the EPA from prospective owners of
contaminated property for covenants not to sue, the EPA has adopted a policy under which it
may consider entering into a pre-acquisition agreement with prospective property owners.
EPA MEMORANDUM dated June 6, 1989 from Edward E. Reich and Jonathan Z. Cannon to
Regional Administrators, Regional Counsel, and Waste Management Division Directors "Re:
Guidance on Landowner Liability Under Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA, De Minimis Settle-
ments under Section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements with Prospective Landowners
of Contaminated Property," reprinted in HAZARDOUS WASTE AND SUPERFUND 1990, at 33
(American Bar Association, 1990). A pre-acquisition agreement would include a covenant not
to sue, which would provide protection from civil liability under §§ 106 and 107(a) of CER-
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There is also the issue of "real" versus "perceived" risk. The use of "haz-
ardous materials" in the operations of the acquired entity, and the presence
of these hazardous materials at the acquired facilities, will many times lead a
buyer to insist on indemnification even though there may not be a presently
existing condition that could lead to liability under current law.83
The parties may also focus on "fault" with respect to past conditions for
which indemnification is requested. In particular, a seller will often take the
position that it will be responsible for environmental conditions it may have
caused, but not those caused by its predecessors. Although some environ-
mental statutes assign liability to the party that engages in an advertent ac-
tion,84 other statutes provide for liability solely on the basis of a person's
status. For example, a party may be liable due to its status as an owner or
operator of, or responsible party with respect to, a facility or vessel.85 Each
party to the indemnity may be equally blameless with respect to an environ-
mental liability, but under the law the liability may attach irrespective of
fault, 86 and thus, the parties need to decide how that risk is to be allocated.
In most negotiations, three issues typically arise with respect to the scope
of indemnity. The remainder of this subsection is devoted to a discussion of
these issues.
CLA and § 7003 of RCRA arising from contamination of a facility that exists as of the date of
acquisition of the facility.
Conceptually, a pre-acquisition agreement is a useful tool to limit environmental liability in
the acquisition of property where contamination is known to exist, because in such cases the
"innocent landowner defense" under CERCLA (see supra note 80) is not available. The condi-
tions that have to exist before the EPA's policy can be utilized and the limited protection
provided by such a covenant not to sue, however, raise questions as to how much practical
protection the policy provides.
In particular, a covenant not to sue would not provide protection against actions brought by
state governments under comparable state provisions, unless the states were also parties to a
covenant not to sue. Perhaps even more importantly, a covenant not to sue would not provide
protection against third-party plaintiffs bringing toxic tort or other actions. Even if the cost of
cleanup can be quantified, the costs associated with potential third party actions, by their very
nature, are not determinable.
83. The presence of a hazardous material, no matter how broadly defined, will not neces-
sarily result in liability. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., RCRA of 1976, § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1983 & Supp. 1990) (provid-
ing liability for "[a]ny person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or exports
any hazardous waste.., who knows at that time that he thereby places another person in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury").
85. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1983 & Supp. 1990) provides for the liability of
"the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility," and "any person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of .... " Section 1002(a) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-380, 104 Stat. 484, imposes liability for removal costs and damages on each "responsible
party" for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial
threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the
exclusive economic zone. The term "responsible party" is defined to include: (i) any person
owning, operating or demise chartering a vessel; (ii) any person owning or operating an on-
shore facility (other than a pipeline); (iii) the lessee or permittee of the area in which an off-
shore facility (other than a pipeline or a deepwater port) is located or the holder of a right of
use and easement granted under applicable law for that area; (iv) the licensee of a deepwater
port; and (v) any person owning or operating a pipeline.
86. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (CERCLA
liability imposed on current owner of facility without regard to causation).
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1. Current Versus Future Law
The parties will need to consider, as between themselves, who will be re-
sponsible for liability arising out of a condition existing prior to closing as a
result of a post-acquisition change in the law. The buyer will contend that
the preexisting condition is attributable to the seller, who would be liable for
remediation but for the acquisition by the buyer. Additionally, the buyer
will be concerned about retroactive liability imposed by future environmen-
tal laws. a7 The seller will point to the increasing stringency of environmen-
tal laws and argue that it should not be required to provide indemnity for a
situation that cannot be currently ascertained. Language drafted to imple-
ment this aspect of allocation of liability should deal with instances where a
successor law replaces the current law with no essential change in coverage,
or where the actual statutory or regulatory provision does not change, but its
judicial or administrative interpretation does.
2. Presence Of Hazardous Materials Versus Hazardous Materials
Liabilities
The presence, in and of itself, of hazardous materials at a property site will
not necessarily impose liabilities on the property owner under applicable en-
vironmental laws."" Hazardous materials are commonly used as an integral
part of many manufacturing processes or used in machinery and equip-
ment.8 9 Environmental liabilities arise out of contamination caused by im-
proper management or disposal of such hazardous materials. Generally
liability is triggered by a release, threatened release spill, emission or dis-
charge or that is not covered by government permits, that exceeds a reporta-
ble quantity or that poses the potential for offsite contamination. The
primary liability of concern for property owners is the remedial obligation
that can be imposed under CERCLA and similar state laws, requiring the
property owners and other responsible parties to clean up, or reimburse gov-
ernmental agencies or private parties for expenses they incur to clean up,
contamination attributable to the property. 90
An indemnitor does not want to be in the position of agreeing to provide
indemnity with respect to the presence of hazardous materials unless that
87. See, United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-
37 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
88. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 521-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (mere presence of
hazardous wastes, without a related CERCLA release or threatened release, did not give rise
to contingent claim). See also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. Certain materials that constitute "hazardous substances," "extremely hazardous sub-
stances," "hazardous chemicals" and "toxic chemicals" are the subject of public reporting and
notification requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
of 1986 (EPCRA), which was enacted as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA Title III), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-50. Texas and other states have similar reporting requirements. See e.g., the Texas
Hazard Communication Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 502.001-.016. (Vernon
1991).
90. See CERCLA §§ 106, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 361.272-73 (Vernon 1991).
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presence could actually result in the indemnitee's liability. 9' The indemnitee
on the other hand wishes to avoid problems that contamination may cause in
the future, whether under current law or, as discussed above, under future
law.92 The presence of contamination could adversely impact the develop-
ment of the property or even the normal conduct of business operations.
Additionally, the buyer does not want to be subject to the enforcement dis-
cretion of government agencies under cleanup standards that tend to be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis.9 3 A possible compromise position is for
the seller to accept the risk of liability arising out of the preacquisition pres-
ence of hazardous materials, but only to the extent that such presence consti-
tuted a violation of, or created a remedial obligation under, applicable law.
In drafting the indemnification language, the buyer will desire to avoid
using language that limits coverage to the liabilities arising out of "violations
of environmental laws." Under the strict liability provisions of CERCLA,
remedial obligations can arise without a violation of law. If an environmen-
tal indemnity provides coverage only for "violations of environmental laws,"
recovery could remain unavailable if a governmental authority never issued
a notice of violation.94
3. Voluntary Versus Mandatory Cleanup
For various reasons, the buyer typically will seek the right to institute
cleanup voluntarily at a site, even where the cleanup has not been mandated
by government authorities. Although quantities of on-site hazardous mater-
ials may be below required response levels, it may be advantageous to per-
91. In Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Duracell Int'l, Inc. 665 F. Supp. 549, 570, 572 (N.D. Tenn.
1987), a seller indemnified the buyer for all environmental cleanup costs "imposed by law."
PCB contamination had been discovered at one of three manufacturing facilities purchased
from the seller. The buyer took various actions in anticipation of regulatory requirements,
negotiated various standards of cleanup with regulatory officials, and conducted preliminary
investigations of the other two sites (even though the only basis for investigating the other sites
was the fact that contamination had been discovered at the first location). Some of these costs
were not technically "imposed by law" since governmental authorities had not required the
buyer to conduct tests at these facilities. The court determined, nonetheless, that the buyer
should recover all of its response costs in the "imposed by law" indemnity. The court argued
that "reasonable actions taken in good faith to fulfill legal obligations or to avoid the risk of
liability are 'imposed by law' within the meaning of an indemnity." Id. at 570.
92. Governmental authorities may be willing to settle at the present time for a lesser stan-
dard of site remediation (or will not be willing to get involved approval of the sufficiency of the
cleanup at a site), causing indemnitees to be concerned that future third party claims may
nonetheless arise against the site. See, Corash, supra note 5, at 257-58. In addition, govern-
ment authorities may elect to re-open their review of a cleanup site, notwithstanding prior
approvals obtained for such site. Under CERCLA § 121(c) (42 U.S.C. § 9621(c)), if a reme-
dial action is selected that results in any hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants
remaining at the site, the EPA is required to review such remedial action within the succeeding
five year period. This requirement "assure[s] that human health and the environment are
being protected by the remedial action being implemented." If that standard is not met, fur-
ther remediation at the site may be required.
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. See, J. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5, at 283 ("A common error in environmental agree-
ments is to assume that so long as no 'violation' of an environmental law exists on the prop-
erty, no environmental liability exists. . . .[B]eing the possessor of a large environmental
problem often only coincidentally evidences a violation of the law").
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form the cleanup sooner rather than later. Delay in cleanup may adversely
affect the operations at the site or future cleanup standards may become
more stringent and remediation more expensive.
Additionally, certain materials, such as asbestos and other indoor pollu-
tant materials, may present health hazards and exposure to liability under
toxic tort actions even though there is presently no statutory response action
required with respect to such materials. 9" The seller providing indemnifica-
tion will, of course, resist any voluntary cleanup prior to clear indication
from the government that remedial work is required.96 If remediation is
required, the seller will want to minimize the cost of that cleanup.
The applicable cleanup standard may also be the subject of heavy negotia-
tion. The indemnitor will resist any indemnification obligation that could
impose stricter standards than those required by the government. On the
other hand, a number of cleanup options may exist, some of which may be
more beneficial to the indemnified party than others. Absent language to the
contrary, the indemnity will not be construed to cover the "best" cleanup
plan for the indemnified party, but only the plan which renders the site
"clean enough."'97
C. The Obligation
Once the scope of the indemnity has been determined, there are a number
of issues that involve the "mechanics" relating to the obligation created.
1. What Are The Contingencies Indemnified Against?
Generally the covered obligations of the indemnitor created by the indem-
nity will be stated broadly to include indemnity for not only liabilities and
damages, but also for losses, costs and expenses, claims, causes of action,
proceedings, judgements, damages, fines and penalties. This allows a court
to interpret the indemnification provision without distinguishing between in-
demnities against liabilities from those against losses, and how each of those
95. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
96. See Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elec. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232
(E.D.N.C. 1988) (indemnitors resisted cleanup cost reimbursement where costs were incurred
"voluntarily" and had not been ordered by either state or federal authorities); Cf P.H.
Glatfelder Co. v. Lewis, 746 F. Supp. 511, 516 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (claim under indemnification
provision of acquisition agreement arising out of indemnitees' payment of alleged tax defi-
ciency without assessment by government authority).
97. In Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Duracell Int'l, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549, 565 n.33 (N.D. Tenn.
1987), the plaintiff determined that extensive PCB contamination and cleanup would leave a
less productive manufacturing facility than if the plaintiff simply closed the facility perma-
nently (after stabilizing the contamination problem to the satisfaction of state authorities) and
moved to another location. The cost of shutting down the facility permanently was apparently
higher than the cost of moving to another site, but not appreciably so. The long-term produc-
tion value of a new facility was markedly better than the old facility. Id. Nonetheless, the
court held that the indemnity could not be construed to cover the cost of permanently shutting
down the old facility and moving to a new facility, arguing that "the indemnity does not
require that [defendant] underwrite the most economically productive solution to the... PCB
problem." Id. at 571.
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differ from a hold harmless agreement or an agreement to defend. 98 The
buyer may also seek to include "diminution in value" within the definition of
covered obligations. Such a concept attempts to address, on behalf of the
buyer, the economic impact of environmental hazards that do not cause the
buyer to incur out-of-pocket expenses, but have an adverse effect on the
value or marketability of the property.
2. Who Is The Indemnitor?
An indemnity is only as good as the financial wherewithal of the indemni-
tor. The indemnitee will seek a "deep pocket" as the indemnitor. Usually
the indemnitor is the person or persons who receive the direct benefit from
the transaction. The acceptability of such an indemnitor will depend in part
on whether the seller will continue to own substantial assets following the
transaction. Additionally, an indemnity may be provided by a party that
receives an indirect benefit, such as a parent corporation where its subsidiary
is selling assets.99 Even if financial wherewithal is sufficient for the present,
financial stability, or even corporate existence, can change over time. To
guard against these future credit risks, the indemnitee may seek to require an
escrow arrangement, a letter of credit or a surety bond to back up the indem-
nity obligation.
3. What Parties Are Indemnification Beneficiaries?
In an acquisition transaction, the buyer naturally will be an indemnified
party. Additionally, the indemnification should recognize that successors of
a purchasing entity, or the heirs and legal representatives of a purchasing
individual, should succeed to the coverage provided to the original indemni-
tee. A buyer should also insist on having the indemnification continue to
extend to its assigns. In view of the owner and operator liability that can
arise under CERCLA and other environmental laws, the buyer should insist
that coverage extend to officers, directors and shareholders, and should addi-
tionally request coverage for its employees, attorneys and agents. 1o
98. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
99. The enforceability of such an obligation under Texas law may depend on whether
there is sufficient consideration flowing to the parent to support the obligation. See, TEX. REv.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1991).
100. See, e.g., Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 273-75 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (liability
of individual shareholders as "owners" of a closely-held corporation under CERCLA based on
the substantial ownership of the corporation by the shareholders); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent
Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1544 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (liability of corporate officer or director
under CERCLA based on whether that individual could have, based upon general authority
and specific responsibility for health and safety practices, prevented or significantly abated the
release of hazardous substances); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22-23
(D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (liability of parent corporation as an "opera-
tor" under CERCLA based on parent's exercise of control over its subsidiary's management
and operations). See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 763 F.2d 1316, 1322
(11 th Cir. 1985) (indemnity contracted for by corporation "presumptively includes the acts of
employees and agents of the corporation within the line and scope of the agency relationship").
See generally, Phillips, Personal Liability under Environmental Laws, in TEXAS ENVIRONMEN-
TAL SUPERCONFERENCE (August 19, 1990).
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4. What Are The Limits Of The Indemnity Obligation?
An indemnification provision may be drafted so as to impose an unlimited
indemnification obligation on the indemnitor. In most negotiations of risk
sharing and the scope of the indemnification, however, the indemnitor is
successful in setting limits on its obligation. The limits may encompass the
following concepts:
a. The Floor For Coverage
The indemnitor may insist that the indemnitee incur a minimum covered
obligation, and thereby exceed a set threshold "floor," before the indemnifi-
cation obligation arises. The aggregate claims that comprise such a mini-
mum loss are usually referred to as a "basket." The concept behind the
basket is that the indemnitor should not be asked to address small amounts
of losses. The basket applies to individual claims as well as claims in the
aggregate. The floor can act as a "deductible," meaning that the indemnitee
recovers only the amounts in excess of the threshold, or a "cliff," meaning
that the indemnitee recovers all amounts of covered obligations once the
threshold has been crossed, rather than only the amounts in excess of the
threshold.
Many times the trigger provisions in indemnities, and in related represen-
tations and warranties, are qualified by a materiality standard. Under this
type of trigger provision, liability arises only if the breach is "material." Ma-
teriality can be defined either quantitatively (e.g., claims that individually or
in the aggregate exceed a certain value, which may be expressed as a percent-
age of the acquired entity's balance sheet or income statement) or qualita-
tively (e.g., claims that individually or in the aggregate adversely impact the
ability of the acquired entity to conduct its operation in the same manner as
it did before the acquisition).10 1 To the extent that certain environmental
matters are specifically addressed in the indemnity, these matters may be
excluded from the basket provisions and treated separately without the ne-
cessity of reaching the floor applicable to non-environmental matters.
b. The Cap On Coverage
The indemnitor may also seek to limit the maximum amount of monetary
liability under the indemnity. As the indemnitor, the seller will generally
argue that the maximum indemnification should not exceed the amount of
the purchase price paid by buyer. The underlying rationale is that where the
seller is in corporate or limited partnership form, the seller has limited liabil-
ity and should not be responsible for covering losses that it would not be
liable for had it not sold. This argument will not necessarily be persuasive in
light of liabilities arising under CERCLA and other statutes that, as a practi-
101. Applying both the materiality exception and the basket concept may result in a
"double dip" in favor of the indemnitor. This would result where immaterial items are not
counted toward the basket. Immaterial breaches would be excluded from the basket even
though they could be material in the aggregate. Egan & Folladori, supra note 5, at 71.
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cal matter, may not be limited by corporate or similar limited liability
ownership. 10 2
The indemnitor will also attempt to limit the term of its indemnification
obligation and establish a final end to its continuing obligation. 103 The in-
demnitee will be concerned that third party environmental claims may arise
at any time in the future and will not necessarily be cut off by a statute of
limitations. Therefore, the indemnitee will attempt to assure that the indem-
nity period runs for a term sufficient to allow the indemnified matters to be
identified or all claims to be raised. 1°4
c. Sharing
The indemnification provision may also call for the parties to share cov-
ered obligations between the floor and the cap. For example, the indemnitor
may be responsible for all covered obligations up to a set monetary thresh-
old, after which the parties share responsibility for the obligations, in a dol-
lar for dollar ratio (e.g., for every three dollars of losses paid by the
indemnitor, the indemnitee will be responsible for one dollar of losses). The
parties could also provide for a shift in the sharing ratio over time, with the
indemnitee assuming a greater portion of the obligations over the life of the
indemnity.
5. Notice And Defense Of Third Party Claims
Typically, an indemnification provision will require the indemnitee to
timely notify the indemnitor of the assertion of any claim or the discovery of
any fact upon which the indemnitee intends to base a claim for indemnifica-
tion. 10 5 Many indemnification agreements provide for release of the indem-
102. See United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988) ("CERCLA
places no importance on the corporate form"); Price, "Liability of Corporate Shareholders and
Successor Corporations for Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)," EPA MEMORANDUM (June 13, 1984)
(EPA may disregard the corporate entity when the shareholder controlled or directed the
activities of a hazardous waste generator, transporter, or facility). But see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T. L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting appellant's contention that
CERCLA imposes direct liability on parent corporations for violations by wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries; holding that corporate veil should not be pierced to impose liability on facts
presented).
103. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing "continuing obligations" of
indemnities).
104. Environmental matters may be contrasted with other matters that are more suscepti-
ble of identification through buyer's due diligence. Even if an environmental condition is iden-
tified, the determination that the condition has to be remediated, or a claim that the
indemnitee has responsibility for such remediation, is generally within the discretion of govern-
mental authorities. As a result, although the indemnification for many corporate matters will
be capped at the one to five year range, the time frame may be significantly greater with respect
to environmental matters.
105. Section 16.071 of the TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE may limit the
enforceability of notice requirements contained in a contractual indemnification. Section
16.071(a) provides: "A contract stipulation that requires a claimant to give notice of a claim
for damages as a condition precedent to the right to sue on the contract is not valid unless the
stipulation is reasonable. A stipulation that requires notification within less than 90 days is
void." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.071(a) (Vernon 1986). Where an indem-
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nitor's obligations with respect to any claim of which timely notice is not
given. A more sensible approach is to carve back the indemnitor's obliga-
tions only to the extent that the indemnitor is adversely affected by its failure
to receive notice.
The indemnitor typically will want to control any litigation or responses
to third party claims, and may stipulate in the indemnification provision that
its defense obligation is premised upon the use of counsel selected by the
indemnitor. With respect to claims relating to environmental matters, the
indemnitor will want to reserve the right to participate in settlement negotia-
tions and negotiations with governmental authorities relating to the scope of
required corrective action. Because any one environmental matter may trig-
ger multiple claims by various governmental authorities and private claim-
ants based on numerous statutory and common law theories of liability,
indemnitors will want to retain the ability to devise and implement a strat-
egy to address the various sources of exposure. The indemnitee will want to
retain the ability to participate in any settlement negotiations that relate to
matters other than monetary damage, such as settlement of matters that
could impose criminal penalties on it or its officers, directors or employees.
Indemnity agreements commonly include provisions that prohibit either
party from settling a claim without the consent of the other.
6. Right To Remedy
The indemnitor has an interest in reserving the right to remedy the envi-
ronmental condition triggering the indemnification obligation. The right to
remedy allows the indemnitor to control the remediation process, along with
its attendant costs. To preserve its ability to do such work, the indemnitor
should reserve a right of access, under license or otherwise, that will allow it
and its agents to enter the contaminated property and conduct the necessary
remediation activities. 106 The indemnitee will want to provide for reason-
able limits on the indemnitor's activities to minimize the disruption of the
operations at the site. Additionally, the indemnitee will want assurance
from the indemnitor that all such work will be done in compliance with
applicable laws (so generator liability for the materials disposed of from the
site does not later return to the indemnitees) and cleanup standards.
7. Impact Of Third Party Protections On Indemnification Obligation
The indemnitor will want to determine whether any other parallel protec-
tion from environmental liabilities is already available to the indemnitee
from other sources. If so, the indemnitor should insist that the indemnifica-
tion agreement requires that such protection will be primary and pursued by
the indemnitee before the indemnitor's obligations arise. The parallel pro-
nity agreement does not require notice, the courts will not infer a notice requirement as a
condition precedent to a right to recover on the indemnity agreement. Fontenot v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1221 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law).
106. See Gebhardt, The Environmental Inspection Easement: An Essential Commercial
Loan Document, 107 BANKING L. J. 317 (1990).
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tection could include governmental reimbursement programs and insurance
coverage,' 0 7 or other sources of contractual indemnification (including any
such indemnification rights relating to the assets being acquired that the
seller previously received and are being assigned to the buyer in the present
transaction). Both the indemnitor and the indemnitee will need to ensure
that these sources of potential recovery do not, by their terms, limit such an
arrangement in such a manner that neither party may recover available
funds.
In Texas, the Petroleum Storage Tank Remediation Fund establishes a
reimbursement program for corrective action involving product release from
petroleum storage tanks. 08 Under certain circumstances, eligible owners
may, upon satisfaction of a $10,000 deductible, recover up to $1 million per
occurrence in cleanup costs associated with a leaking petroleum storage
tank. Eligibility under the Remediation Fund may be forfeited if application
for reimbursement is not timely or properly made, or if the tanks otherwise
fail to comply with applicable registration and financial responsibility re-
quirements. 0 9 Where a seller agrees to indemnify a buyer for liability aris-
ing out of underground storage tank leakage prior to the date of sale, the
seller should insist that the indemnity agreement obligate the buyer to take
all necessary steps to first seek recovery under the Remediation Fund before
claiming recovery under the indemnity. The seller may also take the posi-
tion that if eligibility under the Remediation Fund is denied due to the
buyer's own fault, buyer should not be able to claim under the indemnity as
an alternate source of recovery.
Among the assets of a company a buyer acquires in a stock acquisition
transaction will be any historic commercial general liability insurance poli-
cies relating to the acquired company's business or assets. Additionally, in
an asset acquisition transaction the buyer may seek to include within the
definition of the assets being transferred certain of seller's rights relating to
the property or operations being sold. Those rights may include rights to
insurance coverage provided by historic commercial general liability insur-
ance policies. 110 Although such insurance policies have become increasingly
107. See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
108. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3573 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
109. See, 15 Tex. Reg. 3,558-59 (June 19, 1990) (proposed amendment to be codified at 31
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 334.302 and replacing emergency § 334.502 adopted on January 26,
1990). See also Texas Water Commission, TWC Petroleum Storage Tank Guidance Manual
for LPST Cleanup in Texas, at 9-1 through 9-7 (1990); Edwards, LUST - Deep in the Heart of
Texas: Federal EPA Regulations Affecting Underground Storage Tanks - The Texas Statutory
and Regulatory Counterparts, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 401, 446-47 (1990).
110. Commentators have questioned whether an assignment of a policy will be binding
upon an insurance company whose consent has not been obtained. See J. APPLEMAN, 5a & 7
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3425, 4269 (1942, 1970 & Supp. 1990) (stating that anti-
assignment provisions in insurance policies are generally enforced). There appear, however, to
be several circumstances under which such assignments may be upheld. See e.g., Ocean Acci-
dent & Guarantee Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 1939), cert.
den. 306 U.S. 658 (1939) (a general assignment of a liability policy in a bill of sale was upheld
as to losses occurring before the transfer of assets); University of Judaism v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 132 Cal. Rptr. 907, 910, 61 Cal. App. 937, 942 (1976) (an arbitrary refusal by an insurer
to consent to an assignment of a fire policy merely because it was not informed of the assign-
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more restrictive in pollution and contamination coverage, 11 such policies
may be available to cover third party claims and, under older policies, per-
haps an insured's own property damage claims. 112
& Avoiding Inadvertent Admissions Of Liability To Third Parties
Finally, parties negotiating an indemnity agreement must be sensitive to
third party liabilities that inadvertently may be created by language included
in the indemnity agreement itself. For example, where a seller agrees to
retain any liabilities arising out of conditions identified in a pre-transaction
assessment, the seller may insist that the contract contain a provision that
such an undertaking does not constitute any type of admission that those
conditions arise from acts of or conditions created by seller or constitute
violations of applicable laws. 113
III. CONCLUSION
The courts have upheld, in large part, the attempts of parties to allocate
between themselves contractually specified risks of environmental liabilities.
Common law principles governing the interpretation of indemnities and stat-
utory limitations on indemnification need to be identified and addressed in
the negotiation and drafting process to avoid frustration of the parties' in-
ment until after a loss had occurred was not consistent with the duty of good faith); National
Am. Ins. Co. v. Jamison Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1974) (an unconsented
assignment of a fire policy to the sole shareholder of a dissolved corporation did not work a
forfeiture of coverage where the assignment did not increase the risk or hazard of loss).
11. In 1986, the so-called "absolute pollution exclusion" clause was added to the standard
form liability policy. Hendrick & Wiezel, The New Commerical General Liability Forms-An
Introduction and Critique, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 319, 346-47 (1986).
112. See Parker, Past Policy Coverage Issues-Including Third Party Rights to Insurance
Contracts, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SYMPOSIUM (South Texas College of Law Seminar, 1991);
Gordon & Westendorf, Liability Coverage for Toxic Tort, Hazardous Waste Disposal and Other
Pollution Exposures, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 567 (1989). In addition, the duty to defend under an
insurance policy is considered to be broader than the duty to indemnify. See National Grange
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404, 1407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("the obligation to defend has been deemed 'litigation insurance' as well as 'liability insurance.'
Thus, the insurer is required to provide a defense to any action, however groundless, in which
there exists any possibility that the insured may be held liable for damages where facts are
alleged within the coverage of the policy" (footnote omitted)). As a consequence, a seller
attempting to minimize its indemnity exposure to a buyer might require that the buyer first
seek coverage and defense costs from the buyer's own insurance policies. In addition, the seller
may wish to require a waiver of subrogation rights so that, in the event the buyer's insurance
policies cover the relevant cleanup costs, the buyer's insurer cannot thereafter pursue the seller
under a subrogation claim.
113. In Pennzoil's $11 billion dollar jury verdict against Texaco in 1985, significant weight
was attributed to the admissions seemingly drafted into the indemnity agreement between Tex-
aco and the Getty interests. See, e.g., T. PETZINGER, JR., OIL & HONOR: THE TEXACO-
PENNZOIL WARS 300-01 (1987) (use of the indemnity provisions in voir dire of the jury panel
by plaintiff's counsel); Hayes, Texaco Tells Court It's Fighting for Life, N.Y. Times, December
6, 1985, at D-1, col. 4 ("the biggest evidence against Texaco in the case was the company's
willingness to indemnify all Getty officers and directors against any charges of wrongdoing
that they might face in reneging on the Pennzoil agreement in favor of Texaco's offer"); Mof-
fett, Petzinger & Stewart, Courting Disaster: How Texaco Turned Big Takeover Victory Into
Bigger Legal Loss, Wall St. J., December 20, 1985, at 12, col. 2 ("the jury interpreted the
indemnities as evidence that Texaco knew Getty and Pennzoil had a deal.").
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tent. Additionally, particular environmental concerns, such as arrange-
ments for one party to indemnify the other against liabilities under
CERCLA, will affect the negotiations of the parties. Subject to these consid-
erations, the only limit in indemnification arrangements is the creativity of
the negotiators and their scriveners. Solutions to environmental issues aris-
ing in a transaction should be addressed in the context of the particular envi-
ronmental risks identified. Using a boilerplate approach for contractual
allocation of environmental risk may create unintended consequences, with
neither party receiving the bargain it attempted to negotiate.

